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The aim of this paper is to describe some similarities and differences 
encountered when comparing legal translation and comparative law as 
separate yet interrelated disciplines. To this end, their respective 
objectives and methods are broadly outlined. This is followed by a case 
study on translations of a specific legal text into English and German 
which have been produced by candidates sitting the Norwegian National 
Translator Accreditation Exam. In this paper, I intend to show that 
comparative law “in the traditional sense” (Friedman, 1990, p. 49) is 
much concerned with issues of translation and show that there are not 
only similarities but also differences. 
1. Introduction 
Obtaining new insights is, in general, the purpose of the method of 
comparison (Novalis).1 In this paper the comparison is between two 
different disciplines: translation studies that have evolved from linguistics 
(Snell-Hornby, Pöchhacker, & Kaindl, 1994) and which are part of the 
humanities, on the one hand, and the study of law, on the other. Because 
law spreads into virtually every area of life and society, it crosses the 
boundaries between the social sciences and the humanities.  
To compare two objects or concepts generally presupposes that 
they are similar with respect to at least one aspect (“tertium 
comparationis”). Judgements about similarity depend partly on the 
properties of the objects or concepts being compared and partly on what 
the person judging considers relevant to the assessment; similarity thus 
has both objective and subjective sides to it. It is therefore not surprising 
that different definitions exist of what constitutes a tertium 
comparationis.  
 In comparative law there is no unanimous understanding of what 
should be considered as tertium comparationis (Brand, 2006–2007; 
Örücü, 2006, pp. 442–443).2 Usually one agrees that two concepts can be 
“[...] legal translation occurs between legal 
systems and [...] some of the most 
challenging exercises in comparative law 
are translations.” (Šarčević, 1997, Preface) 
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compared if their function is the same or they solve the same problem – 
this is called the functional approach. According to the communicative-
functional approach in translation studies, the tertium comparationis that 
must be taken into account by a translator in order to choose an 
appropriate translation strategy are the purpose and the intention of the 
relevant communicators. 
One subdiscipline of the study of law is comparative law. The 
purpose of comparative law is to compare different legal systems and in 
using this method the investigator can make observations and gain 
insights. This is not possible when the investigator studies only his or her 
national law. Merryman, Clark and Haley (1994, p. 1) argue, therefore, in 
their introduction, first, that teaching “comparative law” could more 
accurately be called teaching “foreign law”, since the description of 
foreign legal systems is seen as its principal aim and, secondly, that it 
could be argued that “true comparative law” is rather rare. Seen from 
their point of view, one central reason for studying foreign law is that 
foreign legal systems fulfil the role of a source of ideas and/or examples 
of different ways of defining and dealing with common social problems 
(Merryman et al., 1994, p. 1). In such a case, one country and its 
particular legal system may adopt aspects of another country and its legal 
system by introducing “legal transplants”.3 Another important reason is 
seen in the fairly recent attempt at the international unification of private 
law, which necessarily calls for the description and evaluation of different 
kinds of private law system. Even if Merryman et al. (1994) are speaking 
of “unification”, I would still argue for the applicability of private law to 
harmonisation as a “weaker” form of unification.4  
In a recent handbook on comparative law (Örücü & Nelken, 2007), 
it is stated that comparative law has often been criticised for lacking in 
theory and being Eurocentric and primarily private law-oriented. But due 
to globalisation/harmonisation/democratisation, legal areas other than 
private law are now gaining in importance. Nevertheless, the empirical 
material for this paper (section 3) is drawn from the subdomain of family 
law in the area of private law. The reason for this is the claim of its 
having undergone a “silent revolution” (Boele-Woelki & Sverdrup, 2008) 
in recent years in Europe/EU and hence its importance to many legal 
systems.  
Friedman (1990) claims that comparative law “in the traditional 
sense, is concerned, above all with issues of translations” (p. 49), a 
position which, in my opinion, is well suited for the purposes of this 
paper’s approach. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
starts with some general remarks on methodological similarities and 
differences for both legal translation and legal comparison, with a special 
focus on the concept of interpretation in the subsections that follow. 
Section 3 presents a case study on legal translation in the field of family 
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law, reflecting recent changes in the Norwegian and English legal 
systems. The concluding remarks are given in section 4. 
2. Some general remarks on methodological similarities and 
differences 
Interpretation is the common methodological approach for both 
disciplines. But “interpretation” itself is ambiguous, being classified 
differently in legal comparison and translation studies. Bühler (1999) 
rightly points out that it is taken for granted (in the philosophy of the 
humanities and of the social sciences) that “interpretation” (p. 117) 
unambiguously refers to only one well-defined activity − such as 
“assigning meaning to something” (p. 117) − and argues that “attempts to 
give a unitary account of interpretation fail to do justice to the 
multifariousness of the activities commonly called ‘interpretation’” (p. 
117). Due to space constraints, this topic cannot be dealt with in detail 
here. However, underlining that the rules of interpretation differ in both 
disciplines should suffice for the moment. 
2.1. Interpretation in legal studies  
In legal studies one rightly maintains that interpretation is vital, both for 
the purpose of understanding the wording of the pertinent legislative text 
as one special type of legal text (for instance, a single provision) and for 
the ensuing applicability of the legal rule in question. 
Interpretation in legal studies is not the same as interpretation (= 
understanding) in legal translation (see subsection 2.2). Different legal 
scholars have pointed out that there usually cannot be one correct 
interpretation of the law (e.g., Nerhot, 1990, p. 193). They claim that 
jurisprudential interpretation must carefully avoid the fiction (emphasis 
added) that a legal norm admits of only one “correct” interpretation. A 
similar view is held by Fischer (1984, p. 60). To Nerhot (1990, p. 195) 
the legal rule is a result of, not a starting point to, interpretation. In 
Curzon (2002), the interpretation of statutes (one specific genre of legal 
texts) is explicated as “a contextual approach designed to identify the 
purpose of a statute and to give effect to it” (p. 226, emphasis added). The 
method(s) used for identifying the purpose of a legislative text may vary 
between different legal systems.  
How, then, is interpretation, i.e. the identification of the purpose of 
a statute, “when there is no obvious meaning to a statutory provision” 
(Curzon, p. 226), dealt with in the Norwegian, German and English legal 
systems?  
 For legal interpretation there exists a particular methodology (at 
least within the German (and Norwegian) legal systems) based on the 
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work of Savigny, a famous 19th-century German lawyer (Savigny, 1951). 
His legal methodology, in which he differentiated between three main 
interpretation methods in legal interpretation, that is, grammatical, 
historical and systematic, and since supplemented by the teleological 
interpretation (the purposive approach), is still applied. The first step in 
interpretation is always the grammatical interpretation, where the 
investigator looks for the literal meaning of the pertinent text. Since 
(common) language is inherently vague and since legal language shares 
this feature, the judge often needs to apply other approaches when 
deciding on a particular case. In addition to legislative texts per se, other 
legal sources may be used to clarify a particular case. 
2.2. Interpretation in translation studies – with special respect to 
legal translation 
For the purposes of this paper, I restrict the term “legal translation” to 
authoritative texts (legislative texts as specific texts translated for a 
specific purpose). Its objective is to compensate for the inherent 
conceptual incongruence between two legal systems by producing a 
translation that promotes uniform interpretation and application in both 
source and target legal systems. By comparing the translation with its 
source text, the translator’s objective is to convey to the addressee(s) the 
“legal equivalence”, as Herbots argues: “Le texte d’arrivée doit avoir la 
même signification juridique (c’est-à-dire qu’il aura les mêmes 
conséquences en droit) que le texte de départ”5 (Herbots, 1987, p. 822, 
emphasis added). Kisch concludes, “Bref, la question de l’équivalence est 
une question d’ordre pragmatique”6 (1973, p. 412, emphasis added).  
It is commonly acknowledged that (the activity of) translating 
presupposes an interpretation (an effort at grasping the sense) of the 
source text in its context and that legal translation differs from other 
Language for Specific Purposes (LSP) translation such as medical or 
technical translations (Simonnæs, 2009b, p. 164). Adhering to the 
pragmatic-functionalist approach, the primary function of legislative texts 
is regulatory (prescriptive) and as such these texts differ from other LSP 
texts. 
As one cannot translate what has not been understood, 
interpretation as a means of understanding is therefore of the utmost 
importance in translation studies. This is generally accepted. And 
understanding in many cases presupposes an interpretation (grasping the 
sense) of the linguistic expression(s) because legal language often is 
“largely incomprehensible […] sometimes even for lawyers” 
(Beaugrande 1987, p. 178). The interpretation (grasping the sense) in turn 
is based on the translator’s pre-understanding (Gadamer’s 
Vorverständnis: Gadamer, 1988) of the particular problem at hand.  
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When it comes to understanding a foreign legal system, this 
implies that the translator should at least have some basic knowledge of 
the other legal system and legal culture. 
Legal system and legal culture are inherently interwoven (Sunde, 
2010), the difference being, as argued by Friedman (1990, cited in Kötz, 
2005), that the study of legal culture “takes as an axiom the fact that two 
societies can have similar ‘legal systems’ in some formal sense; and yet 
different systems in terms of living law or actual practice” (p. 93). From 
this it follows that the translator must be aware of the most obvious 
similarities and differences between the systems and cultures being 
analysed. The Norwegian and German legal systems, in particular, do 
share a lot of similarities due to the influence of Roman law on their 
development. Consequently, one might expect similarities, but one must 
also be aware of the peculiarities of each system. Of vital importance to 
translation is ensuring that the legal effects are the same in both the 
source language and culture and the target language and culture. 
2.3. Legal comparison – a prerequisite for the translator? 
According to Zweigert and Kötz (1996, p. 14), the literature on legal 
comparison as a method is rather scarce, and they claim at the same time 
– rightly so – that the primary function of legal comparison, as with all 
other scientific methods, is the pursuit of knowledge. However, to be able 
to gain knowledge about the foreign legal culture x, the scholar from 
culture y needs to understand or grasp the sense of the expressions in that 
language (= language x) when no translation is available. Even if a 
translation is available, the problem still prevails, since it is now the 
translator who must first have understood the linguistic expressions in 
language x and the original author’s message, not simply the words, 
before he or she can successfully translate into the addressee’s language. 
By doing this, the translator is partially applying a method of legal 
comparison, e.g. when comparing the court system or other legal 
institutions, such as marriage, in two different legal systems. The 
Norwegian court system differs considerably from the German system 
due to the fact that Norway is a unitary and Germany a federal state, and 
that same-sex marriages are not recognised in the German legal system.7  
When having to compare pertinent legal institutions, one obviously 
cannot expect a translator who is not a lawyer to be able to apply the 
chosen method (i.e., a functional method of comparative law)8 with all its 
subtleties. Šarčević (1994) rightly points out that legal translators need 
training in legal hermeneutics and must be able to foresee how the text 
will be interpreted by a competent court. The ideal solution would, of 
course, be for the legal translator – a person with some knowledge of the 
pertinent legal domain – to work in a team with a lawyer where both 
would gain from being aware of the other’s frame of reference. 




2.4. Translation strategies: from literal to communicative translation  
Historically, legal translation followed mainly the source-oriented 
translation strategy, that is, a literal translation, rather than the target-
oriented translation strategy. After the so-called “cultural turn” in the 
1980s, when factors other than purely linguistic ones began to be taken 
into account, the translator’s translation strategy may shift according to 
the purpose (Vermeer’s skopos; Vermeer, 1996)9 of the translation. Other 
scholars would rather describe this approach as taking the particular 
communicative situation into account, thereby drawing on the Lasswell 
Formula (Who says what in which channel to whom, and with what 
effect?) (Lasswell, 1948 p. 37), which in turn takes us back to 
Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd century BC) and his rhetorical advice of 
quis quid quando ubi cur quem ad modum quibus adminiculis (who, 
what, when, where, why, in what way, by what means). However, as 
Šarčević (2000, pp. 18–19) rightly argues, this approach cannot be 
applied to legal translations without restriction because these texts are 
subject to special rules that govern their use in the mechanism of the law.  
When translating legislative texts, the translator will usually have 
adhered closely to the wording of the source text (e.g., in a recent 
publication on the Norwegian Dispute Act (tvisteloven) translated by 
Bessing, Schrader and Lipp (2011, p. 135)). In Simonnæs (2009a), I was 
able to demonstrate how translation theories affect the translation of such 
texts using the functional-pragmatic approach as one particular modern 
translation theory and to investigate translation solutions in the field of 
lexical and syntactic problems on the basis of a small corpus of legal texts 
from the Norwegian National Translator Accreditation Exam 
(Translatøreksamen). The translation brief and the legal force of a 
particular text strongly influence the translation strategy to be applied. 
Whenever the legal force of the source text supersedes that of the target 
text, the strategy of the translator should be nearer the ‘documentary’ 
(Nord, 1989) end of the continuum. 
3. Case study on translation into German and English in the field of 
family law: recent and related changes in the Norwegian legal system 
I now turn to some observations from the point of view of a practitioner 
and teacher in legal translation, using a recent example from the 
translatøreksamen. The source text, Forskrift om fastsetjing av 
medmorskap av 15.12.2008 nr. 1362, had to be translated i.a. into English 
and German. The Regulation was a direct consequence of other, more 
recently adopted legislative changes in Norway, such as felles 
ekteskapslov (the Common Marriage Act), the Children Act (lov om barn 
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og foreldre), the Act relating to adoption (adopsjonslov) and the 
Biotechnology Act (bioteknologilov).  
Many European countries already allow same-sex marriages, even 
a Catholic country like Spain. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, same-
sex couples have until recently only been allowed to enter into civil 
partnerships, a separate union that nonetheless provides the legal 
consequences of marriage. Since July 2013, this has changed.10  
The topic of fertility treatment for lesbian couples, as in the text 
under scrutiny, should therefore be highly relevant to a translation 
assignment across borders and legal systems. 
In what follows, I use two examples from the lexical choices of the 
candidates. 
3.1 Forskrift 
The heading of the text reveals that this is a type of secondary legislation. 
Knowledge of the hierarchy of legal sources in the target legal system is 
presumed to be known to the candidates. Furthermore, the candidate may 
use all kinds of reference work, with the exception of access to the 
internet. She or he might, for example, consult a Norwegian–English 
legal dictionary where each entry is accompanied by some context, which 
is crucial to finding the adequate translation. 
(1) forskrift provision; requirement; rule, regulation; direction [cf. 
bestemmelse; instruks; regel] 
(2) […] 
(3) Nærmere forskrifter om […] kan gis av departementet – The 
Ministry may give more detailed regulations concerning […] 
(Lind, 2009). 
Most candidates have consequently opted for ‘regulation’ in the heading 
of the relevant Regulation. In contrast, the candidates translating into 
German used Vorschrift, a false friend of the Norwegian forskrift, the 
expected and correct translation being Verordnung. 
3.2 Medmor / medmorskap 
Another well-known challenge for the translator is the translation 
of culture-bound legal concepts. In the source text we find, for instance, 
the pivotal concepts of medmor and medmorskap designated by medmor / 
medmorskap [literally: comother / comotherhood]. These terms were 
recently introduced to cover the concepts of medmor and medmorskap 
arising from the new form of parenthood in a same-sex marriage of two 
women. As mentioned above, the Common Marriage Act (felles 
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ekteskaplov) no longer distinguishes between same-sex and heterosexual 
marriages. A new form of parenthood based on modern assisted 
reproductive technology (ART) was consequently introduced in same-sex 
marriages between two women, thus abandoning the traditional view of 
parenthood based on a father and a mother. But this new legal 
understanding of parenthood applies only to children born after 1 January 
2009, whereas parenthood for children born before 1 January 2009 has to 
be declared as stepchild adoption. This change gave rise to the concept of 
medmor designating a woman in a same-sex relationship (marriage or 
non-marital cohabitation) who has not given birth. The child has to be 
conceived  
• after assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatment 
• with sperm from an identifiable and registered donor and 
• with written consent to ART treatment prior to the treatment  
Now, faced with legal concepts specific to a particular legal system such 
as medmor, the translator has first to determine whether there is a 
comparability “quant à la substance” (Kisch, 1973, p. 411) in the target 
legal system. If this is not the case, the translator must strive to convey 
the meaning of the concept by describing and/or explaining what lies at 
the heart of the concept (concept nucleus, Begriffskern, Jesch, 1957, p. 
172) and at its periphery (Begriffshof, ibid.).11 To find out whether there 
is a comparability “quant à la substance” in the target legal culture, the 
English and German legal cultures must be compared to the Norwegian 
one with respect to the regulation of same-sex relationships, hence 
applying one kind of functional approach of comparative law. The 
German legal system does not allow same-sex marriages; in the English 
legal system this was not the case in 2011, when the text had to be 
translated (cf. endnote 10). Consequently, there are no legal concepts 
similar to the Norwegian medmor and medmorskap and the translator had 
to apply an appropriate strategy to cover the linguistic and legal gap. 
Since medmorskap was introduced as a new legal concept by the 
Children Act, the candidate has had to be creative in finding an adequate 
designation. But do translations of legal texts allow for creativity? 
Šarčević argues that legal translators can indeed be creative (2000, p. 
282), drawing on examples from bilingual and bilegal12 (common law and 
civil law) Canadian legislative texts 2000, pp. 284–287) What can 
candidates do when source and target texts do not belong to the same 
legal culture and system, as in the example under discussion? 
With respect to the different strategies a translator can apply when 
coping with translation problems at a conceptual level, Šarčević (1997, p. 
255), citing Akehurst (1972), makes the point that when there is no 
adequate functional equivalent, the best solution is to use neutral terms, 
“i.e. non-technical terms”. The use of neutral terms is especially 
recommended when the intention is that the source term and its 
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equivalent should have a meaning independent of a particular legal 
system. Since full equivalence can rarely be obtained due to the system-
specificity of legal terms, Sandrini (1996) rightly claims that the concept 
of equivalence must be revised and argues for an approach that aims 
rather at a complete documentation of a particular concept instead of a 
complete conceptual correspondence.13  
Theoretically, the candidates have a wide range of strategies to 
choose between (Chesterman, 2000). Literal translation (of particular 
terms within the text) is usually the norm, particularly if we are talking 
about documentary (sensu: Nord, 1989) translations. This would be the 
proposed strategy for the relevant terms. A quick look at the translations 
reveals the following renderings: 
• (English) “joint mother”, “co-mother”, “joint status as mother” and 
“joint maternity”, “joint status as mother”, “co-motherhood” and 
“co-maternity” 
• (German) “Teilmutter”, “Mitmutter” and “Teilmutterschaft”, 
“Mitmutterschaft” 
The first strategy applied by the candidates is to use a calque of the 
Norwegian term where the same prefix is used: co-mother/co-
motherhood, Mitmutter/Mitmutterschaft. The Norwegian prefix med, 
which corresponds to the preposition ‘with’, is highly productive and is 
used with a wide range of nouns: medforfatter, medeier, medarbeider, 
etc. The prefixes co- in English and German as well as mit- in German are 
equally productive and are used with the same types of noun: 
medforfatter (co-author, Co-Autor), medeier (co-owner, Miteigentümer), 
medarbeider (co-worker, Mitarbeiter). Those who have opted for this 
solution have used their linguistic knowledge about word formation with 
productive prefixes in their respective target languages. One might 
assume that they started out by searching for other expressions in 
Norwegian where the prefix med is used and have then translated 
medmor(skap) using the same pattern. As one can see from the examples 
above, the use of these prefixes is by no means limited to legal language.  
The other strategy is less transparent. The prefix med has been 
replaced in English by an adjective also conveying the idea of 
motherhood being shared. Interestingly, the adjective “joint” in English 
has a certain legal ring as documented in legal expressions such as joint 
stock company, joint will, joint liability, joint custody, joint venture 
(Curzon, 2002). The translation into Teilmutter(schaft) follows a similar 
strategy: the designation seems to have been coined from Teileigentum 
(‘part ownership’) and other compounds with “teil” as, for example, 
Teilcharter (“partial charter”), regulated in the German Civil Code, 
BGB. These terms also convey the idea of sharing.  
 The choice of the adjective in the English rendering and of 
compounding in German seems to be motivated both in English and 
 Ingrid Simonnæs 
 
156
German by the desire to stay within the legal register. Candidates who 
have opted for these solutions therefore draw not merely on their 
linguistic knowledge, but also on more specific knowledge regarding 
legal language. Their choice is therefore understandable in the light of 
general linguistic knowledge combined with knowledge about traditional 
legal register. The proposed translations might therefore function 
adequately in the given context. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper has been to highlight some similarities and 
differences between legal translation and “traditional” comparative law. 
In broad outline, their respective objectives and methods were first 
described from a theoretical point of view. This was then followed by a 
case study on translations of a legislative text into English and German 
produced by candidates sitting the Norwegian National Translator 
Accreditation Exam. I have chosen to focus on the micro level, that is, on 
concepts and their designations. The reason for doing so is that, in my 
view, the challenge in translating legislative texts is easily documented by 
comparing the concepts of the source text embedded in their legal culture 
or system and finding comparable concepts (such as forskrift and its 
equivalents in English and German) due to the similar hierarchy of legal 
sources. However, when the translator is confronted with a legal gap 
(such as the non-existence of the concept medmor due to the different 
legal solutions in family law), she or he must find a way to convey the 
meaning. The few examples I have been able to indicate possible ways of 
doing so. The most applied strategy seems to be to keep to a close – word 
for word – translation strategy as advocated in the literature.  
Notwithstanding the fact that only a few examples are given, what 
I have tried to show in this paper is that comparative law “in the 
traditional sense” (Friedman, 1990, p. 49) is closely concerned with 
issues of translation, although there are, of course, not only similarities 
but also differences. 
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1  “Auf Vergleichen, Gleichen läßt sich wohl alles Erkennen, Wissen usw. zurückführen” 
(Novalis Schriften, 1923 p. 45). 
2  Örücü raises the question if that should be “the ‘common function’ between institutions and 
rules, or the common goal they are meant for to achieve, or the ‘problem’, or the ‘factual 
situation they are created to solve or the ‘solutions’ offered?” (2006, pp. 442–443). 
3  The designation ‘legal transplant’ was first used by Watson (1993) and has since been seen 
as a main device in comparative law for analysing the importation of foreign legal practices 
(Langer, 2004, p. 5). 
4  Following Boele-Woelki (2008, p. 414), the difference lies in the fact that 'unification' of the 
law leads to the application of identical rules whereas the 'harmonisation' of the law is less 
far-reaching. 
5  “The target text shall have the same legal meaning (i.e. the same legal consequences) as the 
source text.” (author’s translation). 
6  “In sum, the question of equivalence is a question of pragmatics.” (author’s translation). 
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7  However, the current state seems to be changing. Germany’s Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) has recently awarded registered partnerships the same 
inheritance rights as married spouses and changes in the tax legislation are to come.  
8  Michaels (2006, pp. 340-342) maintains that the functional method has become “both the 
mantra and the bête noir of comparative law” and argues convincingly that there is not ‘the’ 
functional method, but many. In referring to functionalism as ‘the’ dominant method of 
comparative legal studies Brand (2006–2007) refers to the functionalist’s belief that the 
“‘function’ of a rule, its social purpose, is the common denominator (tertium comparationis) 
that permits comparison” (Brand, 2006–2007, p. 409), however not without showing to 
some real problems with the functional method and proposing his own approach. 
9  For a critical assessment of the skopos theory within the functional approaches in translation 
studies cf. Chesterman (2010). Cf. also Simonnæs (2012, p. 133), discussing the similarities 
of “purpose” in legal studies and translation studies. 
10  On 17 July 2013 the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 was enacted allowing for the 
marriage of same sex couples in England and Wales. 
11  Cf. Heck (1932, p. 52), who used the same designations, as far as I know, for the first time. 
12  In Canada common law is practised in the English-speaking provinces and civil-law in the 
French-speaking province of Quebec. (http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/03.html) 
13  A complete documentation in this context could be given in the translator’s footnote. 
